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Brief Summary
Adaptation to climate change featured very prominently during the Bali UN climate
conference in December 2007. Given the accelerating threats of climate change in
particular for developing countries, immediately increased adaptation efforts are
needed. Now, after agreeing the Bali Roadmap with the objective to finalise a new in-
ternational climate change agreement by 2009, it is time to assess the state of knowl-
edge on key questions which arise from the Bali Roadmap. These include aspects like
a streamlined definition of adaptation, the scale of, the responsibility for and the in-
struments to generate increased funding, but also questions of decision-making struc-
tures. The upcoming negotiations will have to address these questions, in addition to
those related to mitigation efforts in order to avoid dangerous climate change.
This briefing paper analyses the decisions taken in Bali and discusses relevant ques-
tions with regard to adaptation for the upcoming negotations, starting with the Bang-
kok Climate Change Talks held in early April 2008.
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Executive Summary
Adaptation to climate change featured very high on the agenda of the UN climate change
conference held in Bali in December 2007. In the Parties’ rhetorics, it has reached an
equal footing with mitigation. However, both adaptation and mitigation are inextricably
linked to each other, and if global greenhouse gas emissions will not be reduced drasti-
cally with the objective to limit global warming to below 2°C above pre-industrial levels,
many countries’ adaptive capacities will be strained. The probability of triggering large-
scale risks in the climate system, the so-called tipping processes, increases beyond this
temperature threshold.
The Bali conference ended with the adoption of the so-called Bali Roadmap which out-
lines the negotiation framework towards the adoption of a new global post-2012 climate
treaty hopefully by no later than the year 2009. The negotiation structure has developed
into four so-called building blocks: mitigation, adaptation, technologies and finance. This
paper analyses the implications of the agreement made in Bali with regard to the adapta-
tion challenge in developing countries and the key questions that arise for the negotia-
tions.
Building Block Adaptation
The Bali Roadmap entails a very broad definition which has to be further contextualized
to operationalise it. A focus of future adaptation actions needs to be on those developing
countries particularly vulnerable, which are the Least Developed Countries, Small Island
Developing States and countries in Africa prone to weather-related disasters such as
droughts and floodings. However, there are also other countries which view themselves
as very vulnerable, and being vulnerable will very likely lead to increased opportunities
to receive adaptation funding. Further concretisation of the implications of vulnerability,
such as the level of preferential treatment in receiving financing, is needed. Also, the role
of the Convention in relation to its scope and its limitations to foster adaptation effec-
tively has to be clarified.
Building Block Finance
Numerous estimates on the costs of adaptation to climate change in developing countries
undertaken by well-known organisations have shown that the scale of costs is much
higher than the adaptation financing provided so far through means such as funds under
the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol or Official Development Assistance (ODA). While the
costs may amount to USD 50 billion annual extra costs within the next two decades, cur-
rent financing is in the order of less than one billion USD. Present funding is neither suf-
ficiently predictable, since it primarily relies on voluntary contributions by Annex-I
countries. Filling up this "adaptation financing gorge" will be crucial if an equitable cli-
mate change agreement is to be reached that addresses the situation of those affected by
the adverse consequences of climate change. A number of financing instruments are be-
ing discussed, such as the auctioning of emission allowances in existing Emission Trad-
ing Schemes or in sectors presently not covered by the Kyoto Protocol (international
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aviation and maritime transport), levies in these sectors, and the extension of the Adapta-
tion Fund levy of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) to other flexible mecha-
nisms under the Kyoto Protocol. In sum, these instruments would have the potential to
generate financing in the order of tenth of billions of dollars and thus could meet the es-
timated costs of adaptation in developing countries. However, at this stage of the negotia-
tions it is not foreseeable if any of these and which instruments will be implemented
eventually.
There is no doubt that, based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibili-
ties, the developed countries will have to bear a large share of the investments needed to
adapt in developing countries. How the share will be distributed to countries according to
their capabilities and historic responsibilities for anthropogenic climate change remains a
point of debate in different burding sharing concepts. Also, some developing countries
will be expected to contribute to international adaptation financing, since an increasing
share of the population is becoming part of the global consumer class. However, even if
the necessary means will be generated, there is still the question of decision-making
structures and priorities for spending the money. The Adaptation Fund decision-making
structure, agreed on in Bali, gives much weight to the developing world and has to be
judged as one of the most democratic international decision-making structures. However,
there is uncertainty if the AF will be the primary channel to finance adaptation in devel-
oping countries, or if for example the developed countries choose to bypass this new
structure and instead of favor donor-dominated structures, such as the World Bank. Fi-
nally, the question also needs to be raised if and how those people most affected by cli-
mate change will be given high priority in a regime which is negotiated among govern-
ments which often marginalise the poor. Increasing their adaptive, but also absorptive
capacity remains an important challenge.
Building Block Technologies
The dissemination of technologies relevant for adaptation is hampered by barriers related
to resource constraints and scientific and technical aspects. Improving the identification
of technology needs and their effectiveness as well as tools and methods to assess the
quality of technological cooperation are important issues to support technology imple-
mentation for adaptation, which will be on the post-Bali agenda.
In addition to the Bali Roadmap, some more relevant decisions were being taken in Bali,
like the extension of the mandate of the Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LEG),
a new  five-year mandate for the Expert Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT) and, last
but not least, the operationalisation of the Adaptation Fund under the Kyoto Protocol.
Next steps after Bali
The Bali Roadmap is only a framework for the negotiations of the next 18 months, and
thus most of the questions raised have not been answered by the Bali outcomes. A first
step for the concretisation of the answers to these questions will be the Bangkok Climate
Change Talks held in early April 2008, which has the objective to agree on a work pro-
gramme among Parties how, when and in which sequence the numerous issues are being
negotiated, and supported by submissions and in-session workshops.
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1 Introduction
Adaptation to climate change featured very prominently on the agenda of the UN climate
change conference held in Bali in December 2007, highlighting in particular the needs of
the countries most vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change. In terms of the
rhetoric of the Parties, it has reached an equal footing with mitigation..Both mitigation
and adaptation are inextricably linked with each other. The level of mitigation determines
the level of temperature increase, and this determines the magnitude of climatic changes
that mankind has to adapt to. The interconnectedness also becomes clear when countries
highly at risk from climate change – such as Mauritius, a Small Island Developing State
(SIDS) – not only demand adaptation support, but short-term and faster mitigation efforts
to limit global warming in particular to avoid the passing of so-called tipping points:
"We recommend greater focus on the threat of abrupt climate change, including from ice
melt, where the "tipping point" for the resulting catastrophic sea-level rise may be as
close as ten years; on immediate climate mitigation strategies that can produce near-term
mitigation to avoid this and other tipping points for abrupt changes, in order to get a fast
start that complements mid- and long-term strategies"1
Figure 1: Tipping elements in the climate system
Source: Germanwatch illustration modified after Schellnhuber/Jaeger 2006
Some of the tipping elements being discussed would directly affect areas with a high
population density – such as the Indian Monsoon change or glacial melting in the Tibetan
Plateaus and the Himalayas – while others would have severe consequences on a global
level, including positive feedback effects which further trigger global warming – such as
the Dieback of the Amazon Rainforest, accelerated sea-level rise due to the instability of
the West-Antarctic and the Greenland Ice Sheet or methane release due to permafrost
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loss. The tipping processes are a key reason why many scientists, non-governmental de-
velopment and environment organisations and policymakers – such as the EU – are call-
ing for the limitation of global warming at less than 2°C above pre-industrial levels.
Failing to take the necessary mitigation steps needed to achieve this limit will lead to
many countries' adaptive capacities being strained. As a logical consequence, the Mal-
dives’ submission on behalf of the Least Developed Countries clearly calls for global
emission reduction targets at least in the range of the lowest stabilisation scenarios, with
global greenhouse gas emissions being reduced by 50 to 85% in 2050 compared to 1990,
with a corresponding peaking year in 2000 to 2015.2
Against this background, this briefing paper analyses in more detail how adaptation-
related issues were reflected in the outcomes of the UN climate conference held in Bali in
2007, and what Germanwatch sees as the key questions of the adaptation policy debate on
the way to a new climate change treaty. Giving more substance to our understanding of
these questions will probably be decisive, if a new agreement is to effectively support
adaptation to climate change in the most vulnerable regions and communities in particu-
lar.
The exclusive focus on adaptation here is not to suggest that adaptation is more important
than mitigation. The purpose is to explain the road ahead on this issue, which is of par-
ticular relevance for many developing countries. For a more comprehensive  analysis of
the Bali outcomes see the Germanwatch paper "Bali, Poznan, Copenhagen – triple jump
towards a new quality of climate policy?".3
The major outcome of the UN climate conference in Bali was the adoption of the "Bali
Roadmap". Consisting of three policy documents, this Roadmap outlines the further ne-
gotiations with a view to finalising a new international agreement by no later than 2009.
The three key documents are:
- the conclusions of the "Dialogue on Long-term Cooperative Action under the
Convention" (the so-called "Bali Action Plan"), including the establishment of an
Ad-Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA);
- the decision on the "Scope and content of the second review of the Kyoto Proto-
col pursuant to its Article 9";
- and the Conclusions adopted by the "Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Com-
mitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol".
By the end of February 2008, Parties and Observers will submit their views on the work
programme of the AWG-LCA which is to be negotiated in Bangkok in early April 2008.
A compilation of the submissions can be found at the UNFCCC website.4
The structure for the negotiations on a post-2012 policy framework which emerged in
Bali, as agreed upon in the Bali Action Plan, consists of four building blocks: mitigation,
adaptation, technology and financing (fig. 2).
It has to be noted that the Bali Action Plan not only addresses questions that are relevant
for the time beyond 2012, but also actions relevant "now, up to, and beyond 2012".5 The
need for – in this sense – "early action" was an important part of the discussions in Bali
and was also called a fifth building block on a more informal level, with the indispensable
objective of building trust. This primarily addresses expectations placed upon industrial-
ised countries: if they fulfil their past commitments and initiate measures immediately,
even before a new agreement is reached, they would thus show their seriousness in living
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up to their responsibilities and prior commitments. The need for early action has also
been reaffirmed by different Parties in their submissions on the AWG-LCA work pro-
gramme, in particular with regard to adaptation. For example, Argentina expressed the
need to "develop and implement short-term solutions, while addressing the need for and
strengthening mid- and long-term approaches to climate change."6 Bangladesh called for
the "Evolution of fast track procedures for easy access to funding" and stressed that the,
"urgent and immediate adaptation needs of developing countries that are particularly
vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change […] should be dealt along with other
ongoing agenda items under UNFCC and KP."7 Mauritius also emphasised the same
point: "Adaptation needs immediate and expanded funding. While some initial progress
was made in Bali on the issue of adaptation, there is an urgent need for immediate and
expanded funding for low-lying island and coastal developing countries, along with asso-
ciated technology and technical assistance."8
The Bali decisions outside of the Bali Roadmap (chapter 5) are being analysed against the
background of the fifth building block.
Figure 2: The negotiation building blocks
Source: UNFCCC
From Germanwatch’s viewpoint the following five aspects represent minimum require-
ments in the area of adaptation that a fair and appropriate agreement needs to meet:
1. Sufficient and solid funding of adaptation measures and the coverage of damages
caused by climate change in the most vulnerable countries, particularly LDCs and small
island states. This can be achieved with the help of new and innovative financial instru-
ments.
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8 UNFCCC 2008a: 39
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2. Giving priority to the needs of the most vulnerable groups of the population, based on
a human rights based approach9, and to locally developed adaptation approaches against
the negative effects of anthropogenic climate change.
3. Scientific and technological support for the expansion of capacities to design and im-
plement adaptation strategies.
4. Ensuring that support mechanisms create further incentives (such as insurance based
mechanisms) in order to maximise the effectiveness of adaptation strategies;
5. Assessing the political and practical potential of instruments that link mitigation and
adaptation purposes.
Are the Bali decisions a step forward on the way to an agreement that meets these re-
quirements? Answers to these question will be addressed in the summarising Chapter 6.1.
2 Adaptation in the Bali Roadmap
How does adaptation appear in the Bali Roadmap? The most important reference is the
final document of the Dialogue, the "Bali Action Plan".  While adaptation is addressed
separately as one of the four building blocks, the blocks on technology and financing are
closely related to the language that has been agreed on in terms of adaptation, since tech-
nology transfer and implementation and increased financing will be crucial to achieve
sufficient development and effective implementation of adaptation projects, programmes
and activities in developing countries.
Adaptation in the "Bali Action Plan":
1c) "Enhanced action on adaptation, including, inter alia, consideration of:
(i) International cooperation to support urgent implementation of adaptation actions,
including through vulnerability assessments, prioritisation of actions, financial need as-
sessments, capacity-building and response strategies, integration of adaptation actions
into sectoral and national planning, specific projects and programmes, means to incentiv-
ize the implementation of adaptation actions, and other ways to enable climate-resilient
development and reduce vulnerability of all Parties; taking into account the urgent and
immediate needs of developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse
effects of climate change, especially the least developed countries and small island devel-
oping States, and further taking into account the needs of countries in Africa affected by
drought, desertification and floods.
(ii) Risk management and risk reduction strategies, including risk sharing and trans-
fer mechanisms such as insurance;
(iii) Disaster reduction strategies and means to address loss and damage associated
with climate change impacts in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to
the adverse effects of climate change;
(iv) Economic diversification to build resilience;
(v) Ways to strengthen the catalytic role of the Convention in encouraging multilat-
eral bodies, the public and private sectors and civil society, building on synergies among
activities and processes, as a means to support adaptation in a coherent and integrated
manner.
                                                     
9 see also Oxfam International 2008
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2.1 How will adaptation be defined in a post-2012
agreement?
The Bali Action Plan reflects a very broad understanding of adaptation, by listing numer-
ous measures and fields of action that will be considered in the upcoming negotiations
(paragraph 1c)i – 1c)iv). On the one hand this is in line with the scientific understanding
of the close and complex interrelationships between vulnerability, poverty reduction and
adaptation, since there are numerous dimensions and actions which could contribute to
increasing the adaptive capacity of people and countries. On the other hand, this compli-
cates the challenge of streamlining support for effective adaptation strategies.
That is one reason why Bangladesh in its submission on the AWG-LCA work pro-
gramme expresses the need to operationally interpret and contextualize these broad prin-
ciples and activities as one of the first actions, before discussing the "support mechanisms
to enable the parties for the implementation of their assessed adaptation strategies, pro-
grammes and projects."10 The Maldives, on behalf of the Least Developed Countries
(LDCs), also call for a discussion on the interpretation of the listed activities and proposes
the "establishment of a knowledge based adaptation research centre to serve the needs of
vulnerable countries."11
Bangladesh suggests the differentiation between technological, policy based and behav-
ioural activities. Indonesia highlights the "urgent adaptation needs which could include
risk management and reduction strategies" in order to promote climate change resilient
development. The country also sees the need for a focus on nationally identified key sec-
tors, "for instance marine and coastal infrastructure, agriculture, water resources and
human health". Also important is the demand uttered by Bangladesh for a better assess-
ment and prediction of likely medium-term impacts of climate change (10-15 years and
beyond). The National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) provide at least initial
assessments of adaptation priorities in LDCs, but are in no way sufficient to prepare for
climate change.
For example, Mauritius has suggested that the IPCC Assessment Reports should be sup-
plemented with annual updates, which would thus address the pressing need for a better
understanding of climate change scenarios in the short to medium term, and which would
thus better focus and facilitate world wide climate change adaptation strategies.  This idea
is based on the work under the Montreal Protocol where annual assessment processes
provide Parties with a more up-to-date knowledge: "A similar fast-moving process for
climate change should be started immediately, and should address abrupt climate change
as a priority within the next three months."12
2.2 Which countries are viewed as "particularly
vulnerable"?
It is remarkable that the final text of the Bali Action Plan specifies which countries are
seen to be particularly vulnerable – namely the least developed countries (LDCs) and the
small island developing States (SIDS). The separate mentioning of African countries
"affected by drought, desertification and floods" further concretises which countries need
to be the focus of support strategies. Although this is not a new definition of which coun-
tries are seen to be particularly vulnerable, previous draft versions of the document did
not contain such specifications. The LDCs, the SIDS and African countries thus were
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successful in highlighting their particular vulnerability. However, clear and agreed indi-
cators on  their particular vulnerabilities as well as on how adaptation financing should be
made available to these countries, compared to other developing countries, are not at the
table so far. Egypt calls for "the submission of a list of the most vulnerable countries
affected by climate change." On behalf of the LDCs, the Maldives propose the "devel-
opment of vulnerability index criteria to assess the adaptation needs of LDCs, SIDS and
African drought and flood prone countries for preferential treatment in accessing the
funds in the future climate regime."13
This might also become a point of debate, given for example the fact that in absolute eco-
nomic terms the adaptation costs may be much lower in Africa than in Asia, since general
investments in the latter are much higher. This is one conclusion of the adaptation cost
analysis done by the UNFCCC.14 Estimated for 2030, the additional investment needed to
adapt infrastructure to climate change risks in 2030 in Africa is only 1% of the investment
needed in developing Asia.  Of course the costs should be seen in comparison with e.g.
the regions´ GDPs. And this example only relates to a certain fraction of adaptation costs.
The analysis of the submissions made on the AWG-LCA agenda shows that there are also
other countries which identify themselves as very vulnerable, although they do not belong
to the countries emphasised.
For example, Colombia underlines its vulnerability "due to our extensive coastal areas,
the amount of population living along these coasts and the fragility of our ecosystems,
including high mountain ranges and tropical rain forests. Coastal and insular areas in
Colombia are already experiencing impacts caused by global warming." 15
Egypt suggests to focus "on countries with deltas threatened by inundation of sea water,
oceans in view of urgency of this matter and its serious impact on the population and
development course of those countries."16
Uruguay states that "adaptation actions should address all Parties, especially developing
countries which sustainable development depend on a great extent on their natural re-
sources such as coastal resources, agriculture and water resources, and at the same time
are extremely vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change."17
Tied up to the definition of particularly vulnerable countries of the BAP, Bangladesh
proposes a special support programme for developing country parties in particular for
LDCs and SIDs, including
- "Setting up of an International Centre  for Research and Training on Adaptation.
- National capacity self-assessment and capacity building.
- Supporting the developing country parties in particular LDCs and SIDs in for-
mulating their adaptation strategies, and associated programmes and projects to
address the adaptation needs.
- Support institutional and human resource capacity building for the implementa-
tion of assessed programmes and projects for meeting the adaptation needs.
- Development of new and innovative support mechanisms such as micro insur-
ance, micro credit, weather derivatives and other related tools
- Role of different UN and other multilateral agencies in providing the required
services for adaptation."18
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17 UNFCCC 2008a: 89
18 UNFCCC 2008a: 13
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It is very likely that those countries seen as particularly vulnerable will receive more at-
tention from the international community and also receive preferential treatment from
financing instruments under the UNFCCC and a new international climate change agree-
ment, or, how the USA put it in their submission on the AWG-LCA work programme:
"We believe that discussions over the next two years can do much to orient actions at
local, regional, national and global levels toward greater attention to adaptation, and to
generate resources for these efforts for those countries that are most vulnerable to the
impacts of climate change."19
Thus there is a genuine interest to be viewed "particulary vulnerable".
2.3  What is the scope and what are the limitations of the
Convention?
The Parties agreed to consider ways to "strengthen the catalytic role of the Convention in
encouraging multilateral bodies, the public and private sectors and civil society, building
on synergies among activities and processes" in the Bali Action Plan. This points to an
important question: what will be the role of the Convention to facilitate adaptation, and
where are the limits of its scope, given the fact that the whole Convention agenda has
become very complex, that the UNFCCC secretariat has a limited scope, and that adapta-
tion, probably more than mitigation, has to be connected very closely to the circum-
stances where adaptation is needed to take place? For example, mainstreaming adaptation
into development characterised as "the integration of policies and measures to address
climate change into ongoing sectoral planning and management, so as to ensure the
long-term viability and sustainability of sectoral and development investments"20  is a
complex process which has to take place on other levels than on the Convention level.
However the question remains: how can it be facilitated by the Convention?
Levina sorts the different key areas identified by Parties to the Convention in five catego-
ries:21
- a catalyst for adaptation actions at the national and international level
- coordination of adaptation-relevant activities at the international level
- a forum for the exchange of information and knowledge gathering
-  a forum to address the needs of countries particularly vulnerable to climate change
- a catalyst for R&D and technology transfer for adaptation.
In addition, the relationship between the Climate Convention and other Conventions that
have links to adaptation, such as the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertifica-
tion (UNCCD) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), is yet to be defined.
Exchange between the secretariats on overlapping areas of responsibility has begun. For
example, a document by the Joint Liaison Group of the Rio Conventions (JLG), identified
the following possible fields of co-operation :22
- providing focal points of all Conventions with up-to-date information on relevant as-
sessments, research programmes and monitoring tools.
- Collaboration on the development of common messages on the links between  climate
change, biodiversity loss and desertification.
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- Collaboration on development of education materials
- Establishment of joint web-based communication.
But the establishment of more formal links, that could for example be relevant to finance
projects or programmes which closely link adaptation with biodiversity, need to be de-
bated and examined more carefully. The next Conference of the Parties (COP) of the
CBD that will be held in Bonn in May 2008 prior to the 28th session of the Subsidiary
Bodies of the UNFCCC provides an important opportunity to discuss these aspects.
Other related multilateral fora include the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
(ISDR) or the Millennium Development Goals process. The upcoming Financing for
Development-Conference in Doha in late 2008 (MDG process) may also discuss  innova-
tive financing instruments, which so far have been addressed only in the climate change
and adaptation debate.
3 Financing for adaptation in the Bali
Roadmap
"The issue of finance is crucial in a future climate agreement."23
There is no doubt that this statement made by Iceland is true given the large investments
that will be needed to limit global warming, preserve global forests and adapt to the con-
sequences of anthropogenic climate change. This chapter will analyse key questions of
the financing debate with regard to adaptation.
A number of funding sources exist which could  finance the numerous types of adaptation
activities. Table 1 provides an overview.
While there is still uncertainty about the full costs of adaptation in developing countries
(see box 1), there is no doubt that the financial resources provided through the imple-
mentation of the Convention and means such as the Official Development Assistance
(ODA) are far from being sufficient to cope with the challenge of climate change. The
paragraphs contained in the Bali Action Plan clearly underline the need for financial sup-
port of  developing country Parties.
Financing in the Bali Action Plan
1 (e) Enhanced action on the provision of financial resources and investment to support
action on mitigation and adaptation and technology cooperation, including, inter alia,
consideration of:
(i) Improved access to adequate, predictable and sustainable financial resources and fi-
nancial and technical support, and the provision of new and additional resources, includ-
ing official and concessional funding for developing country Parties.
(ii) Positive incentives for developing country Parties for the enhanced implementation of
national mitigation strategies and adaptation action.
(iii) Innovative means of funding to assist developing country Parties that are particularly
vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change in meeting the cost of adaptation;
(iv) Means to incentivize the implementation of adaptation actions on the basis of sus-
tainable development policies;
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(v) Mobilisation of public- and private-sector funding and investment, including facilita-
tion of carbon-friendly investment choices;
(vi) Financial and technical support for capacity-building in the assessment of the costs of
adaptation in developing countries, in particular the most vulnerable ones, to aid in de-
termining their financial needs.
The BAP language has to be analysed against the background of key questions related to
adaptation financing.24
Table 1: Categories of adaptation activities and funding sources
Source: Levina 2007: 41
                                                     
24 see also the submission on the AWG-LCA work programme by the Maldives on behalf of the LDCs,
UNFCCC 2008a
16 Germanwatch
3.1 Are adaptation financing resources adequate and
sufficiently predictable?
Paragraph 1e)i addresses important shortcomings that so far have hampered the develop-
ment and implementation of adaptation strategies: the adequacy, predictability and
sustainability of financial resources and financial and technical support.
A look at the mismatch between estimated adaptation costs and the financial means pro-
vided so far through the Convention Kyoto Protocol mechanisms reveals that the current
funding is not adequate in the sense that it is not sufficient to cope with the challenges of
anthropogenic climate change, primarily caused by the developing world.  (see Box 1). It
is not an exaggeration to speak of an "adaptation financing rift". The already pledged
amounts of money will not even be sufficient to cover the most immediate adaptation
needs in LDCs, as outlined in the National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs).
Scaling up the existing NAPAs of Sub-Sahara African countries to all African LDCs
alone amounts to estimated costs between USD 350  and about 700 million.25 Since the
difference is a magnitude of order, this would still be the case even if one assumes only a
partial responsibility by the developed world for adaptation financing (see also 3.2 and
3.3). The inadequacy of financing is underlined by Parties in the discussion about the
AWG-LCA work programme, inter alia by the Philippines and China. The latter one
clearly asks the developed countries to provide the necessary financing to address climate
change (both adaptation and mitigation) in the order of "no less than 0.5% of their total
GDP to support actions by developing countries".26 This would lie in the order of some
175 billion USD at the moment. Although China does not specify which share of this
money should be earmarked for adaptation, it shows that this proposal reflects the adap-
tation costs estimates in developing countries (see box 1).
Box 1: The "adaptation financing rift"
1. Different adaptation "cost factors"27
a) adaptation costs on a macro-level in ODA
b) "climate-proofing" of other (non-ODA) existing infrastructure
c) new investments necessary because of climate change (e.g. dams, dykes etc.)
d) adaptation costs on community level (community based adaptation, capacity building
by NGOs etc.)
e) adapting poverty reduction to climate change
2. Estimates of annual adaptation costs and the factors included28 in developing
countries:29
-  Oxfam 2007: at least 50 billion USD (cost factors a-d)
-  UNDP 2007: 86 billion USD by 2015 (a, b, e)
-  UNFCCC 2007: 28-67 billion USD by 2030 (a-c)
-  World Bank 2006: 9 to 40 billion USD (a)
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3. Current adaptation-related funding under the Convention and the Kyoto Proto-
col:
- Investments through mainstreaming adaptation in Official Development Assistance:
approx. 100 million USD30;
- Funds under the Convention: approx. 56 million USD (pledged) for the Special Cli-
mate Change Fund (SCCF) and 163 million USD (pledged) for the Least Developed
Countries Fund (LDCF)31;
- GEF Strategic Priority for Adaptation: 50 Mio. USD from 2004 to 200732
- Adaptation Fund under the Kyoto Protocol: ca. 160-950 Mio. USD up to 201233
For the question of costs it is important that the Bali Action Plan addresses the obstacle of
insufficient knowledge about the real costs of adaptation (paragraph 1e) vi), as a kind of
prerequisite for countries needs assessments. As a consequence, Uzbekistan in its sub-
mission on the AWG-LCA work programme propose to "analyse options of financial and
technical support for capacity-building in the assessment of the costs of adaptation in
developing countries."34
The resources and the instruments which would provide these funds are at the moment
uncertain. For example, the two Convention Funds partly financing adaptation – the Spe-
cial Climate Change Fund (SCCF) and the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) - as
well as the GEF Strategic Priority for Adaptation are solely funded by voluntary contri-
butions from developed countries, usually counted as ODA. They depend on national
budget decisions and thus are hardly predictable. It is clear that the adaptation financing
future beyond 2012 does not lie exclusively in voluntary contributions by industrialised
countries. Legally binding quantified targets for adaptation financing could be one option
to ensure the provision of funding, but also the implementation of market-based mecha-
nisms linked with climate change mitigation could be another complementary strategy
(see 3.4).
3.2 What is understood by "new and additional
resources"?
It is important that the developed countries agreed to consider the provision of new and
additional resources, especially for developing country Parties. The "adaptation financing
gorge" in developing countries remains so huge with present financial instruments that
increased financing is not only necessary to live up to the challenge, but also to get the
most vulnerable countries on board in a new climate treaty.
The promise of additional resources is as old as the UN Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change. Article 4.3 of the UNFCCC commits Annex II countries to ‘provide new
and additional resources to meet the agreed full incremental cost of implementing meas-
ures…’ including ‘preparing for the adaptation to climate change’. In addition, Article
4.4 states that Annex II countries ‘shall also assist the developing country Parties that
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are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of
adaptation to those adverse effects.’
However, the issue of "additional" financing is also a contentious one, since by far not all
commitments for financing that were made by industrialised countries in the past were
kept. The most prominent example is the promise to deliver 0.7% of the Gross National
Income for ODA (Official Development Assistance), which only a limited number of
countries have realised so far (although the commitment is more than 30 years old). Many
stakeholders now argue that adaptation financing should not be counted as ODA, since
climate change is seen to be an additional burden that is primarily caused by the devel-
oped world. In this sense, support by developed countries is judged as a compensation for
harms, but not as aid. But for example, the German government and the German Parlia-
ment explicitly express their objective to use funding instruments discussed in the adap-
tation context to raise Germany´s ODA share, which still lags far behind the 0.7%, albeit
increasing. The contributions to the LDCF and the SCCF are also usually counted as
ODA.
 Although the Bali Action Plan now contains language on "new and additional" financial
resources, the following three differences of interpretation may arise:
- Additional to existing adaptation financing provided by developed countries;
- Additional to existing ODA flows;
- Additional to existing ODA commitments (0.7% target).
Many development NGOs interpret the term additional in the third sense. The first reason
is that there was no recognition of the developmen threat of climate change in the 1970s,
when the 0.7% target was agreed. And secondly because the donor countries as those that
have contributed most to the problem through their emissions have a responsibility to
cover the costs of coping with the consequences of climate change. Those Parties that
address the issue of additionality in their submissions on the AWG-LCA seem to refer to
the second option, such as China and Colombia which explicitly expect financial contri-
butions by the developed countries "additional to ODA".35
Although many adaptation strategies overlap with general development objectives, and
integrated approaches are principally preferable to stand-alone adaptation projects, large-
scale diversion of promised ODA to adaptation is unlikely, since even without climate
change the development challenges covered by the ODA fund are already daunting
enough.
On the other hand, from a practical point of view, in most cases the costs for adaptation
can hardly be distinguished from the "development" costs, due to multiple shared inter-
ests and responsibilities. Or it will require huge efforts. Thus a pragmatic approach could
be to raise the ODA quota by a certain percentage equivalent to adaptation-related contri-
butions.
Further clarification probably will be an important discussion point in the negotiation
process to a new climate change agreement.
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Box 2: "Voices" on the additionality of adaptation financing36
‘Adaptation financing was always intended to be additional. ODA came into place from a
different context, that of addressing the problems of disparity between developed and
developing countries. The context was not climate change and anyone talking about ODA
addressing adaptation, I think, is way out of line.’ (Tanzanian UNFCCC delegate)
‘ODA will never be enough even if the countries meet their ODA commitments, which
they are not doing. What you need for adaptation will be in the billions of dollars.’ (Bra-
zilian UNFCCC delegate)
‘You cannot divert funds that are committed to achieve existing development targets such
as preventing HIV and AIDS and fighting hunger. For the implementation of adaptation
measures, innovative and additional means of funding are needed.’ (Dutch UNFCCC
delegate)
3.3 Which instruments will be implemented to provide the
adaptation financing needed?
To fill the adaptation-financing gorge  existing instruments must be strengthened and new
ones must be implemented. The Bali Action Plan mentions the consideration of  "innova-
tive means of funding". It is interesting that this paragraph is exclusively related to "de-
veloping country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse impacts of cli-
mate change", an expression that is highlighted by the Maldives on behalf of the LDCs in
their submission on the AWGLCA work programme.  A number of funding options are
being discussed which altogether would have the potential to fill the gulf identified before
(see box 3). The analysis of the Parties´ submissions shows that there is not much specifi-
cation on preferable instruments at this stage. For example, Bangladesh suggests to as-
sess "sources of funding (including those already discussed such as a carbon tax, avia-
tion tax, raising the percent contributed by CDM activities) that could be mobilised to
generate the necessary level of funding."37
Box 3: Proposals to generate additional adaptation funding
There is still a lot of uncertainty about the real costs of adaptation to climate change in
developing countries. However, there is no doubt that the costs will be much greater than
the funding that is currently available for adaptation financing. In addition to the pres-
ently existing funding instruments (see box 1), a number of other instruments are cur-
rently being discussed which could play an important role for scaling-up the financial
means available.
Extension of the share of proceeds to Joint Implementation and Emission Trading
The extension of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) share of proceeds to Joint
Implementation (JI, emission reduction projects between developed countries) and Emis-
sion Trading will be on the agenda in the context of the review of Art. 9 of the Kyoto
Protocol. According to estimates by the UNFCCC, this extension could generate about 10
to 50 million USD annually by 2010.38  Estimates for a longer timescale will very much
depend on the emission reduction commitments taken by Annex- I countries, but proba-
bly could reach the order of billions in case of deep emission cuts.
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Pakistan in its submission suggest to raise the CDM levy from 2% to 3-5% in order to
increase the financial flows into the Adaptation Fund immediately.39
Auctioning in the National Emission Trading Schemes (EU and others)
In the context of the European Emission Trading Scheme, many countries have entered
into auctioning at least a share of the emission allowances that are given to companies
included in the EU ETS for the period 2008-2012. From 2013 on, it is expected that auc-
tioning will gain increasing importance EU wide.40 Auctioning of 100% in the power
sector, as proposed by the European Commission, could generate some 8 billion EUR (20
EUR per tonne CO2). By 2020, annual revenues could amount to 50 billion EUR in total.
Financing for adaptation in developing countries is listed as one of a number of suggested
spending purposes. However, the Member States have recently questioned the Commis-
sion´s approach of earmarking part of the revenues for specific purposes due to sover-
eignty reasons.
The German government has decided to auction about 9% and expects net revenues of
about 400 million Euro in 2008 which will probably increase over the coming years. Af-
ter intense discussions, it was also agreed that about 120 million Euro will be spent for
international climate change action, half of which is expected to go into adaptation fi-
nancing.
A recent proposal for climate change legislation in the USA (the so-called Lieberman
Warner Bill) also proposes to use part of the revenues from auctioning (5%) for adapta-
tion financing in developing countries. According to estimates from the World Resources
Institute (WRI), the present draft would result in USD 1.27 billion per year and growing
to USD 2.29 billion a year.41
Auctioning on the level of national emission budgets
During the Bali conference, the Norwegian Finance Minister Halvorsen presented an
approach of auctioning in the context of allocating national emission budgets. According
to Norway´s submission on the AWGLCA work programme, it is suggested that a "small
portion of permits could be withheld from national quota allocation, and auctioned by the
appropriate international institution. The resulting revenue could then be placed in a
fund to be used on adaptation actions or other specified purposes such as technology
development."42  In the exemplary case of Germany this would generate about 1.3 billion
USD a year, assuming that the country would have to purchase 10% of its 2012 allow-
ances for a price of 23.60 USD per tonne CO2. Even a small percentage of the auctioning
revenues would deliver a significant amount of funding for adaptation in developing
countries, assuming most or all of the Annex I countries with emission reduction obliga-
tions would join in this approach.
Auctioning in international sectors
Another approach could be to auction greenhouse gas allowances for international avia-
tion and shipping, whose emissions so far are not regulated by the Kyoto Protocol. The
UNFCCC estimates that by 2010 around 22 billion USD could be generated annually,
assuming an allowance price of 23.60 USD/t CO2 and 100% auctioning.43
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Levies on airfares and maritime transport (Tuvalu proposal)
In its "International blueprint for adaptation", Tuvalu proposes the following, differenti-
ated modalities44:
- a 0.01% levy on international airfares and maritime transport freight charges operated
by Annex I nationals;
- a 0.001% levy on international airfares and maritime transport freight charges oper-
ated by Non Annex I nationals;
- Exemptions to (a) and (b) would apply to all flights and maritime freight to and from
LDCs and SIDS (irrespective of whether the airlines or freight are owned by Annex II
or Non Annex I nationals).
At present, no estimates are available on the revenue the Tuvalu proposal  could generate.
International Air Travel for Adaptation Levy (IATAL)
Müller and Hepburn suggest the imposition of a tax on International Air Travel for Ad-
aptation Levy (IATAL).45  According to their calculations a fee of 10 USD per flight
could generate 8 billion USD a year. However, it has to be noted that a number of coun-
tries (developed and developing countries) have already impose a ticket tax to generate
financing for action aiming at the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs).
For the post-Bali negotiations it will be necessary to further explore which instruments
could generate substantial financing and how (politically) probable and how difficult their
implementation is. It is also important to note that similar (or sometimes the same) in-
struments are being discussed  as mechanism that could finance mitigation efforts in de-
veloping countries, including the reduction of deforestation.
It will important for the success of a new and progressive framework that mechanisms to
generate funding for adaptation (and other climate change activities) contribute to mitiga-
tion where appropriate, including those already existing under the Convention/Kyoto
Protocol, but also new ones.46  For example, Colombia in its submission on the AWG-
LCA work programme highlights "the need of increased financial flows and additional
incentives for adaptation in developing countries, in particular through the flexibility
mechanisms of joint implementation and emissions trading."47  This has two important
advantages.
First of all, it furthers the implementation of the polluter-pays principle and secondly, it
has some beneficial strategic implications for the upcoming negotiations. The necessary
funding for adaptation, technology and forest protection will only be generated in case of
a new climate change agreement, for which the emerging economies and other develop-
ing countries will also have to contribute actions to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions.
This linkage may strengthen the evolving coalition of developing countries and progres-
sive industrial nations that benefits both groups equally. This way the climate regime can
become a self-financing system. Some of the potential financing instruments follow this
principle. Investigation of these instruments (and other proposals that might be devel-
oped) after Bali not only requires technical and economic investigation, but also an un-
derstanding of the political will of the Parties.
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3.4 Who should pay and how much? Responsibility and
capacity
Some of the new adaptation financing instruments discussed above would generate
money independent from national budget decisions. However, the question "Who should
pay for adaptation and how much?", related to the particular responsibility of the devel-
oped countries as the main causers of climate change, still needs to be answered, assum-
ing that governments’ contributions will play an important role to generate funding. Or,
how Sri Lanka put it in its submission on the AWG-LCA work programme, "with regard
to funding for mitigation, adaptation and emission reduction, we are of the view that the
Annex I countries hold the responsibility and moral commitment".48
Unfortunately, the Bali Action Plan does not address this question sufficiently. While in
the mitigation section the developed countries agreed to financial and capacity-building
support to developing countries in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner (1b)
ii), which also implies the development of indicators, there is no similar language in the
parts related to adaptation financing. Different publications have developed concepts for a
more systematic distribution of the financial burden for adaptation.
Oxfam developed the Adaptation Financing Index (AFI), which includes the responsi-
bility (per capita emissions from 1992 on) and the capability (expressed by the perform-
ance of countries in the Human Development Index, HDI).49  All countries with an HDI
below 0.9 are excluded from a "duty" to contribute to international adaptation financing,
so only some developed nations remain. The EU and the USA together should provide
more than 75% of the adaptation financing. Russia due to its low HDI is judged as not
being capable, but has per capita emissions higher than Germany.  Thus countries with
high per capita emission and insufficient investments inhuman development are excluded
by this approach.
The Greenhouse Development Rights Framework developed by EcoEquity and others
starts from equal per capita emission rights and "allows" each human being a minimum
level of emissions that is required to fulfil minimum development needs (expressed in per
capita income thresholds, purchasing power parity).  It thus does not explicitly address
the issue of historical responsibility, but sticks to the capacity of countries  and their in-
habitants to pay for climate change adaptation. Since so far wealth  has been produced
with emissions in almost all countries, it implicitly addresses the issue of responsibility
for climate change. Table 2 shows the shares of contributions (RCI columns), according
to different income thresholds. The USA and the EU would be responsible for around
60% of the financing needed. This concepts reflects income disparities within countries,
which is particularly important since also in the developing world the number of people
living (and emitting) on developed countries level is growing. It addresses the global rich
and the global poor, rather than only distinguishing between rich countries and poor ones.
One consequence would be that also emerging economies such as Brazil, China and
South Africa would have their share in financial contributions. The LDCs would have no
responsibility and capacity for that.
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Table 2: Comparison of share of global Responsibility and Capacity Indicator (RCI), national bill at 1
percent of GWP, and per capita bill at 1 percent of Gross World Product (based on fraction of
population over development threshold) for development threshold of $6,000, $9,000 (reference
case), and $12,000.
Source: Baer et al. 2007
Since the financial demand to cope with climate change and to keep it to below 2° tem-
perature increase is massive, not only for adaptation, it is very important that such con-
crete concepts, based on the vision of climate equity, are being developed and discussed.
But it will also require the Annex-I countries to assess the adequacy of funding that they
have been willing to raise so far. For example, Iceland "will use the period of work of the
AWG-LCA to re-evaluate its financing of climate affairs with regard to both domestic and
international action, with a view to significantly enhance it as a contribution to a
strengthened international climate agreement."50
3.5 How will adaptation financing be spent? Decisions and
priorities
Even if sufficient adaptation financing to fill the rift could be generated through whatever
instrument, the question of where, how and with which focus the money would be
spent would still remain. The answer to "where" is closely connected to the definition of
the particularly vulnerable countries (see 2.1).
Decision-making structures
The "How" relates to the structures that decide on the spending of the money. Micronesia
in its submission on the AWG-LCA work programme calls for a "democratic decision
making process."51 The Adaptation Fund Board (see 5.1) obviously comes closest to what
can be called a democratic decision-making process, with all world regions being equally
represented plus extra seats for LDCs, SIDS and one each for Annex I and non-Annex I
countries. Each seat has one vote. This is fundamentally different from other decision-
making structures that are relevant for this debate, in particular that of the World Bank
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related Global Environment Facility (GEF). There, the economic power of the develop-
ment aid donor countries plays an indirect but significant role.
But today it is totally unclear which role the Adaptation Fund will play beyond spending
the money generated through the flexible mechanisms. While it is possible that developed
countries fill up the Adaptation Fund with extra money, so far it is not foreseeable to what
extent this will happen. Probably one prerequisite for greater commitments of them will
be that the Adaptation Fund proves to be well-functioning in terms of effective project
selection and spending of the money. But recent developments also raise concerns that
the developed countries prefer to deliver money to those mechanisms where their influ-
ence is greatest, such as the World Bank. As part of its G8 presidency work, Japan pro-
posed a new financial mechanism with a scale of 10 billion USD. This proposal has been
addressed by recent World Bank work to set up new Climate Investment Funds (CIFs).
Each of the four proposed funds – a Clean Technology Fund (target size 5-10 billion
USD), a Forest Investment Fund (target size 300-500 million USD), a Climate Resilience
Pilot Program (target size 300-500 million USD), and a Strategic Climate Fund - should
have an own governance structure. According to a concept note only representatives from
donor countries would have decision functions, and recipient countries would only be
invited as non-voting members:
"It is proposed that voting members of each fund be contributors to the fund. […] The
Climate Investment Fund Administrative Unit would convene an annual outreach forum
to bring together donors, recipients and stakeholders."52
This approach would mean a major step backwards in terms of a democratic governance
structure orientated at those who are the targets of the money.53 One statement of Argen-
tina in its submission on the AWG-LCA work programme may be interpreted as referring
to this proposal:
"Finally, we would like to emphasise that new, financial mechanisms and instruments for
adaptation created outside the Convention should coordinate with the mechanism devel-
oped under the Convention, with an emphasis on transparency, efficiency, and equity."54
The particular role of the Adaptation Fund and its relationship to outside financing ef-
forts, has been stressed , inter alia by Argentina:
"In this sense, we urge the AWGLCA to explore, as part of its work program, new and
innovative mechanisms to drive developed countries, in a reasonable and fair fashion
according to their historic and current national circumstances, to greatly increase their
contribution to the Adaptation Fund"55,
and by Uzbekistan:
"Establish cooperation with Adaptation Fund for consolidated efforts on financing ad-
aptation projects and programmes in developing countries."56
These two statements make clear that the Adaptation Fund is increasingly seen as the
primary financing structure on adaptation by developing countries, and channelling
means generated through other instruments into the Adaptation Fund would prove a fa-
vourable option. If the Climate Investment Fund initiative would develop to be the devel-
oped countries’ strategy to bypass the more democratic governance structure of the Ad-
aptation Fund, this could hardly be called a trust-building strategy.
                                                     
52 World Bank 2008: 4, 5
53 Mueller/Winkler 2008
54 UNFCCC 2008a: 6
55 UNFCCC 2008a: 6
56 UNFCCC 2008a: 91
Adaptation to climate change - where do we go from Bali? 25
However, it is also worth mentioning that there are doubts regarding the developed coun-
tries’ will to spend huge amounts of money into funds that the national governments or
parliaments have little control of. This is at least the perception that Germanwatch has
experienced in many talks. One option to deal with this problem could be the develop-
ment of regional adaptation cooperation funds, e.g. between the EU and Africa. Criteria
and modalities for such "neighbourhood funds" should either be agreed on an interna-
tional level (e.g. the UNFCCC COP) or be replicated from existing structures, such as the
Adaptation Fund, to ensure consistency with international processes.
Funding priorities
Regarding the focus of adaptation spending, some countries call for prioritisation. For
example, Argentina sees the need to work on "well-defined indicators to determine ad-
aptation priorities" during the AWG-LCA in conjunction with the Adaptation Fund
Board.57 Bangladesh also lists the "prioritisation of activities for funding and the princi-
ples for such prioritisation" as an important agenda item.58
Tuvalu made an interesting proposal in its International Blueprint for Adaptation of how
the means available in the Adaptation Fund could be accounted to different purposes,
which touches both the regional questions as well as priority activities.
Table 3: proposed accounts in the Adaptation Fund
Source: Tuvalu 2007
However, one question that has not be addressed by neither the Bali Roadmap nor by
Parties submissions on the AWG-LCA work programme is which role the communities,
the people mostly at risk from climate change, will play in this debate. According to the
British development NGO Tearfund, the "primary objective of adaptation activities must
be to build resilience and adaptive capacity in local communities. These communities
should participate in planning, decision-making and implementation."59
However, no particular mention of vulnerable groups below the national level can be
found in the Bali Action Plan. One can argue that it is not surprising that the nation states
                                                     
57 UNFCCC 2008: 6
58 UNFCCC 2008: 16
59 Tearfund 2007: 2
26 Germanwatch
that are the key player in the UN do not touch on that issue. Some may argue it would
question their sovereignty rights. But fairness in adaptation to climate change will only be
reached if those that are most affected are not being left aside and ignored by policymak-
ers and implementing agencies. There exists numerous and promising examples of com-
munity-based adaptation.60 But even more important is that there exists a clear mandate,
based on a human rights based approach, to bring the most affected into the focus of in-
ternational and national adaptation strategies and support mechanisms.61 Climate change
can violate human rights, inter alia regarding the Right to Food, to Life and Security and
to Health, and governments who want to engage in adaptation strategies (which they
hardly can avoid) should be aware of this human rights dimension.
At least it will be possible to finance community-level activities through the Adaptation
Fund.62 But this does not mean that communities themselves or community organisations
will be able to access the funds directly (see 5.1.3). Implementing Entities themselves or
their proposals must be agreed on by national institutions (in particular the UNFCCC
focal points), according to the draft version of the invitation to implementing entities.63
Thus, the responsibility to care for community-level involvement remains with national
governments and can not be bypassed in case governments do not pay attention to it.
But even if the Adaptation Fund or other relevant instruments would have available USD
50 billion now, it is questionable if the most vulnerable countries (and also the rest of the
world) are in a stage where they could spend the whole money effectively on adaptation
purposes. The "absorptive capacity" is still limited. Spending the money effectively raises
the same questions that the "aid effectiveness" agenda has to deal with, although adapta-
tion is not only about ODA. But structural aspects in national political institutions, poten-
tials and limitations of approaches like budget or programme support will also be impor-
tant for the adaptation agenda.
3.6 How can adaptation in developing countries be further
incentivised?
To maximise the adaptation benefits realised through increased financial flows, it is also
important that the instruments and channels for disbursement of the financial means in-
centivise further adaptation in the target countries, which must not be restricted to the role
of "co-financing" as an incentive. The Bali Action Plan contains this incentive dimension
explicitly for adaptation in paragraph 1e) ii and iv. The Parties agreed to consider "posi-
tive incentives for developing country Parties for the enhanced implementation of na-
tional mitigation strategies and adaptation action" (ii) and "means to incentivize the im-
plementation of adaptation actions on the basis of sustainable development policies" (iv).
This sentence can also be interpreted in a way that close interaction and synergies be-
tween national sustainable development policies, poverty reduction in particular, is envis-
aged. Clarifying the role and nature of positive incentives for developing country parties
remains one task for the work programme of the AWG-LCA, as the Maldives on behalf
of the LDCs underline in their submission.64
One group of instruments being discussed are insurance-related mechanisms. They are
increasingly gaining attention in the climate policy debate. A key role of insurance in this
context is to make climate-related risks transparent and show where adaptation is neces-
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sary. When well-designed they can set incentives for effective adaptation. The expert
network Munich Climate Insurance Initiative (MCII) also sees "a clear responsibility of
the industrialised countries to support insurance related systems for the increasing dam-
ages and losses in developing countries".65  In this way it is another kind of financing
instrument. A number of formulations in the Bali Action Plan can be connected to insur-
ance:
- Building block adaptation: paragraph 1c)i, ii, iii, v;
- Building block financing: paragraph 1e) iii, iv, vi.
Both Bangladesh and the Maldives on behalf of the LDCs see the need to develop "new
and innovative support mechanisms such as micro insurance, micro credit, weather de-
rivatives and related other tools"66 in their submissions on the AWG-LCA work pro-
gramme. Thus, further exploration of mechanisms to incentivise adaptation is on the
agenda of the Post-Bali negotiations and also the Nairobi Work Programme.
Box 4: New concepts concerning risk splitting and risk reduction67
1. The frequency of disasters due to weather and climate increases and particularly af-
fected are the most vulnerable people in developing countries who are not able to pay for
private insurance. We therefore see a growing necessity for transferring parts of the risk
of floods, droughts, hurricanes etc. to global financial and insurance markets and provid-
ing incentives for adaptation at the same time.
2. Private insurance alone will not be a solution for people in developing countries who
are the most vulnerable but who are not able to pay for private insurance.
3. However, there is a rapid establishment of micro-insurances in developing countries.
This development must not be undermined but supported.
4. For answering the question "How can we reach the poor?" we should definitely con-
sider private-public partnerships (PPP). Almost all of the successful insurance systems
that offer advantages to the poor in developing countries are PPPs of any kind.
5. Nevertheless, it is important that the involvement of the public authorities should not
disturb a major function of insurance: Through insurance the society realises the price of
risk – in this case the price of weather extremes. This implies that the risk share of the
rate should not be subsidised. The contrary is true. Well designed insurance products can
induce the implementation of risk-minimising adaptation measures. One could even think
of a system where poor individuals pay their insurance rate by engaging in local efforts
regarding flood prevention, drought management or storage of food.
6. One point is to make meteorological and risk-related data accessible. Another point is
to enhance the availability of insurance and micro-insurance instruments. Moreover risk
allocation programmes for those who are not able to pay for private insurance could be
invented and funded by international contributions. One possibility might be to create
reinsurance opportunities for micro-insurances and other climate-related insurance in-
struments. The international community could cover risks that exceed a certain upper
limit. Thereby the sensitivity of micro-insurance concepts and other climate-related insur-
ances could be mitigated. Moreover, it would mean a lower rate of payment for the per-
sons concerned. As an example serves the index-based insurance system in Mongolia.
Herdsmen are given the possibility to insure against the loss of their livelihood due to
winter or extreme events. Minor losses that do not affect the foundation of their business
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are paid for by the herdsmen directly. More significant losses however, are transferred to
the private insurance industry. And the highest range of losses from disasters are covered
by the World Bank. Multi-donor organisations might take this role in future, possibly in
cooperation with the World Bank.
7. Where should the money come from? From our point of view Annex I countries should
make binding commitments to contributing fixed annual contributions according to the
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and capabilities. It is crucial that
the fund raising is done in a way that stimulates mitigation of greenhouse gases. The vi-
sion is a self-financed climate regime comprising a global system and regional subsys-
tems.
8. What should be done next and who should do it? It does not make sense to start off
with a global approach but it is better to gain experience fast in some particularly vulner-
able regions. An African insurance organisation might be an appropriate start due to the
exceptional vulnerability of the continent. An alternative starting point might be seen in
creating an insurance fund to support the necessary substantial transformation in the small
island states (AOSIS).
9. Insurance instruments alone do not provide a sufficient solution to the problem. How-
ever, they can serve as an important part of an adaptation system that is drastically gain-
ing in importance.
4 Technologies and technology transfer for
adaptation in the Bali Roadmap
Most of adaptation strategies also incorporate a technology component, assuming a
broader definition of technology which includes "soft technology", e.g. knowledge of
applying, adapting and advancing technologies.68  Table 2 covers some technologies.
Many more exist in different sectors like water resources, public health, agriculture etc.
However, discussion on technology transfer in the UNFCCC and elsewhere have focused
very much on technologies for mitigation, such as renewable energy or energy efficiency
technologies. This was also one of the most contentious issues in Bali (see 4.2). However,
the instruments needed to foster the transfer of climate change adaptation technology do
not differ very much in principle. The principle goal is to overcome barriers that impede
the innovation and distribution of relevant technologies. A recent UN workshop in the
context of the Nairobi Work Programme on Vulnerability, Impacts and Adaptation
(NWP) distinguished two categories of barriers:69
- Barriers associated with resource constraints
- Barriers relating to a lack of scientific and technical capacities and to socio-
economic aspects
o Limitations regarding the integration of adaptation into development
o Lack of technical and institutional capacity.
Activities to foster technology transfer include the preparation of technology needs as-
sessments as some kind of precondition to decide which technologies should be preferred,
financing instruments (which have been discussed before), capacity building for the ap-
plication of technologies as well as the creation of enabling environments for the dis-
semination of such technologies.
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Table 4: examples for infrastructure technologies for adaptation
 Source: UNFCCC 2006
Technologies and technology transfer in the Bali Action Plan
1d) Enhanced action on technology development and transfer to support action on miti-
gation and adaptation, including, inter alia, consideration of:
(i) Effective mechanisms and enhanced means for the removal of obstacles to, and
provision of financial and other incentives for, scaling up of the development and transfer
of technology to developing country Parties in order to promote access to affordable envi-
ronmentally sound technologies.
(ii) Ways to accelerate deployment, diffusion and transfer of affordable environmen-
tally sound technologies.
(iii) Cooperation on research and development of current, new and innovative tech-
nology, including win-win solutions.
(iv) The effectiveness of mechanisms and tools for technology cooperation in specific
sectors.
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As part of the past work of the Expert Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT), technol-
ogy needs assessments (TNAs) for many developing countries have been prepared. NA-
PAs also provide useful knowledge regarding countries needs on technologies that could
be transferred. However, Bangladesh expresses the need for a "stocktaking on the work of
the EGTT before making any recommendation on the revision or updating of the Tech-
nology Needs Assessment Guidelines developed by UNDP".70
Regarding the negotiation language, an important outcome reflected in the negotiation
language is that the objective is "scaling up" of the development and transfer of technolo-
gies (1d)i), which makes clear that more must be done than has been the case. Financial
and other incentives are also mentioned, which relates back to the building block of fi-
nancing. Bangladesh also calls for an assessment of the efficiency and of the potential for
scaling-up of existing technologies for adaptation and asks the AWG to "initiate a proc-
ess of making an inventory (sector wise), facilitate modifications of different technologies
including their scaling up, and facilitate/accelerate deployment, diffusion and coopera-
tion on research and development of current, new and innovative technology, including
win-win solutions."71
Considering "the effectiveness of mechanisms and tools for technology cooperation" (1d)
iv) is one of the most innovative parts of the decisions. So far there has not been any
measurable indicators to assess and evaluate the effectiveness of technology transfer.
Developing these is now part of the work programme of SBSTA and the SBI. Indicators
thus could offer a basis to better hold accountable those that are expected to foster tech-
nology transfer, especially the Annex I countries.
Overall, there is good reason to assume that the lack of financial means available is the
key impediment for an increased distribution of adaptation technologies. Investment in
technology hardware requires resources, capacity building to improve people´s ability to
implement and use technologies as well as to design incentive frameworks requires re-
sources etc. Massively increasing the available resources is a key challenge (see chapter
3).
Finally, it is interesting that a number of countries – inter alia Bangladesh, the Maldives
on behalf of the LDCs, Rwanda and Sri Lanka – address the issue of transfer of environ-
mental unfriendly technologies, the "dumping of redundant technologies from North to
South", as the Maldives expressed it. Not much attention has been paid so far to this side
of technology transfer in the adaptation debate. As a consequence, the Maldives call for a
"Technology Transfer and Development Board" with the objective "to facilitate technol-
ogy transfer and its screening before transfer from North to South or even South to
South."72
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5 Building trust? Further adaptation-related
decisions in Bali
In addition to the negotiations on the Bali Roadmap, some important decisions were taken
in Bali which had adaptation on their agenda. These could to some extent be interpreted
as an element of trust-building and early action. However this should in no way imply
that sufficient early action has been taken in Bali.
5.1 Operationalisation of the Adaptation Fund
One of the most concrete decisions and at the same time one of the most contentious de-
bates in Bali was the operationalization of the Adaptation Fund in the framework of the
Kyoto Protocol. The AF will be financed from the 2% levy on the emission reductions
traded under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). After having agreed on impor-
tant aspects such as the eligibility criteria in Nairobi 2006, there were outstanding issues
in particular with regard to institutional questions that needed to be resolved before the
AF could come into operation. The most relevant decisions taken in Bali in this regard
will be explained shortly thereafter.
5.1.1 Functions of the different institutional components
Three institutional elements were seen to be necessary in order to operationalize the AF:
the Adaptation Fund Board, a secretariat and a trustee. The functions of these three ele-
ments needed to be fixed. Although this may sound trivial in the first instance, these deci-
sions have important implications regarding the power of the respective elements. Given
the fact that the AF will possibly manage billions of USD in the midterm, the floors of the
Bali Convention Centre in fact became subject to fights over power. In the centre of these
discussions was the Global Environment Facility (GEF). This body, closely related to the
World Bank, inter alia manages the existing climate change funds established under the
Convention, the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and the Special Climate
Change Fund (SCCF). The GEF was proposed by the EU as the managing entity as early
as of 2006 which today must be seen as a strategic mistake, since many developing coun-
tries, especially the LDCs,  are not satisfied with the work the GEF has done so far in the
field of adaptation in specific, and how it manages funds in general. One of the reasons
for this opposition is the strong role of the donor countries in the GEF Council. While the
EU again proposed the GEF as the secretariat in Bali, in the beginning developing coun-
tries were still very reluctant to ratify this proposal. According to different delegates, the
GEF then started to lobby strongly in their own interest, what probably is not supposed to
be their mandate.
In principle it would have been possible to decide on all other outstanding issues and
postpone the decision on the secretariat, e.g. after the AF Board´s constitution. However
it has to be noted that the developing countries did not make a proposal alternative to the
GEF. Finally, the GEF was invited to serve as the secretariat on an interim basis, however
with a strictly limited power.  All the decisive functions – like the development of strate-
gic priorities, policies and guidelines, the decision on the projects including the allocation
of funds etc. – are with the AF Board, which will hold its meetings in Bonn, the location
of the UNFCCC, and not in Washington, where the GEF is based.
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5.1.2 Composition of the Adaptation Fund Board
Following the issue of the competency of the AF Board the composition of the Board is
important. Since the AF was set up to financially support adaptation in developing coun-
tries, in the most vulnerable in particular, and since it is not financed by budget resources
provided by developed countries, anything else than a majority of developing countries in
the Board would be unfair and unrepresentative. Table 5 shows the composition as it was
agreed on in Bali.  Developing countries will have the majority in the Board , however
not necessarily the LDCs and the SIDS which are usually those classified as being par-
ticularly vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change. Regarding the decision-
making, a consensus is envisaged and if not reached a two-thirds majority takes the deci-
sion.
Summarising these relevant decisions on the AF, the chair of the LDCs negotiating group
commented as follows: "This is a major victory," said Amjad Abdullah. "The African
countries, small island states and least developed countries stuck together and fought for
a dedicated secretariat with a representative governance board that has special places
for the most vulnerable nations."73
Table 5: Composition of the Adaptation Fund Board
Country group Number
of mem-
bers
Board members (alternate mem-
bers)74
Africa 2 Senegal, South Africa (Kenya,
Egypt)
Asia 2 Qatar, Mongolia (Indonesia,
Uzbekistan)
Eastern Europe 2 Poland, Albania (Russia, Ukraine)
Group of Latin American and Caribbean
countries (GRULAC)
2 Jamaica, Uruguay (Cuba, Argen-
tina)
Western European countries and Others
Group
(WEOG)
2 Switzerland, Germany (Norway,
Finland)
Small Island Developing States (SIDS) 1 Tuvalu/Barbados (Maldives)
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 1 Tanzania (Bangladesh)
Annex I (developed countries) 2 Japan, France (Spain, United King-
dom)
Non-Annex I (developing countries) 2 Colombia, Pakistan (Ghana, Leso-
tho)
16
Source: Adaptation Fund 2008c
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5.1.3 Access to the Adaptation Fund
Who will be able to apply for project or programme support from the AF? Only govern-
ments, or also NGOs which sometimes have built up useful experience in cooperating
with the communities first affected by climate change? It is not surprising that the provi-
sions on access to the AF primarily address the role of the Parties, since these had to de-
cide on the accessibility and usually take care of their sovereignty. Direct access by Par-
ties, "without having to go through ‘implementing agencies’ such as the World Bank,
UNDP, or UNEP."75   However the formulation in paragraph 29 leaves space for inter-
pretation if non-state actors could also apply, at least as long as they are chosen by gov-
ernments as implementing or operating entities and are seen to be able to implement proj-
ects:
"Decides that eligible Parties shall be able to submit their project proposals directly to
the Adaptation Fund Board and that implementing or executing entities chosen by gov-
ernments that are able to implement the projects funded under the AF may also ap-
proach the AF Board directly;"
This formulation is a bit ambiguous and also could be interpreted in the way that non-
state actors could only directly address the AF when they apply with the projects planned
by the government, but not necessarily with own projects separate from government
plans. The draft "Provisional operational policies and guidelines for Parties to access
resources from the Adaptation Fund", in conjunction with the draft version of the "Invita-
tion to Implementing Entities to cooperate with the Adaptation Fund Board" provide a
clearer understanding of how this paragraph is interpreted by the AF secretariat:
Two ways of access are being proposed: Direct access by the Parties through a nominated
in-country executing entity or access through an Implementing Entity recognised by the
AF Board.76 The draft invitation further specifies that "such entities meet the adminis-
trative and financial management guidelines adopted by the Adaptation Fund Board,
and the project proposals are endorsed by the relevant UNFCCC national focal
points."77
Thus, involvement of national governments in one way or the other is a prerequisite
for funding by the Adaptation Fund.
5.1.4 Funding of the Adaptation Fund
Three other decisions taken in Bali which will play a role for the resources available in
the AF should be mentioned.
The first is related to the CDM which at present is the only funding basis for the AF. In
order to improve the competitiveness of CDM projects in LDCs, it was decided to exempt
CDM projects in this country group from the share of proceeds, meaning the AF levy.
However, since the reason for this decision is the fact that almost no CDM projects have
been implemented so far in LDCs, the financial consequences for the AF will be very
limited.
The second is related to the issue of broadening the funding basis of the AF. One option
that is increasingly being discussed is to extend the share of proceeds to the other flexible
mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, Joint Implementation (JI) and Emission Trading. A
decision for this extension has not been taken yet, but it appears as one of the issues that
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should be addressed in the second review of Art. 9 of the Kyoto Protocol.  It is possible
that the extension will be agreed on in the next COP in Poznan 2008. However, consensus
is not ensured yet. The Ukraine, for example, expressed concerns and even threatened to
reject the Art. 9 decision and also the drafts for the Bali Action Plan (see below) in the
final negotiations in Bali. Recording a protest note deterred Ukraine from this step.
Thirdly, since the AF is primarily funded through the CDM share of proceeds, its pros-
pects are directly linked to the scale of emission reduction commitments by Annex I
countries in the post-2012 context. The deeper the emission cuts, the higher will be the
volume of CERs demanded and traded. Although the Bali Action Plan, the Convention
part of the Bali Roadmap, only contains emission reduction figures implicitly – due to the
strong resistance of the USA - , the Kyoto part of the Bali Roadmap, the AWG decision
in Bali, explicitly mentions the range of 25-40% emission reductions by 2020 (compared
to 1990).  This is an important signal to the carbon market and thus also for the funding of
the AF.
5.2 Technology transfer
The technology transfer debate is as old as the Rio Conventions, but lacked innovative
impulses during the last years. In Bali, primarily the perception that Annex I countries
offered too little to foster technology transfer to developing countries almost led to the
"blow-up" of the whole conferences, when neither SBSTA nor SBI could agree on deci-
sion texts in their final night before the ministerial level started. After additional negotia-
tion rounds, eventually decisions were reached.
The following five areas are seen to be particularly relevant in the context of technology
transfer in the Convention:
- Technology needs and needs assessments
- Technology information
- Enabling environments for technology transfer
- Capacity building for technology transfer
- Mechanisms for technology transfer.
The technology package agreed on in Bali entails different elements. One with particular
importance is the extension of the mandate of the Expert Group on Technology Transfer
(EGTT), whose primary task is to analyse and identify measures to enhance technology
transfer. In Nairobi in 2006 the mandate was only extended by one year, since there
where different opinions between developed and developing countries on what should be
the further focus of the EGTT´s work. While the developing countries preferred a
stronger focus on action-oriented measures, especially in the field of adaptation, the de-
veloped countries tended to support a business-as-usual approach.78
In Bali the Parties agreed on a new five-year mandate of the EGTT.79  Given the rele-
vance of technology transfer in the Bali Roadmap and for the development of a post-2012
regime, this extended mandate allows the EGTT to play an important role on the path to
this agreement. This perspective is explicitly addressed in the respective COP decision.80
In addition, the Global Environment Facility has been requested to "elaborate a strategic
programme to scale up the level of investment for technology transfer to help developing
countries address their needs for environmentally sound technologies…."81 . It needs to
                                                     
78 WWF 2007
79 FCCC/CP/2007/L.4
80 FCCC/CP/2007/L.4
81 FCCC/CP/2007/L.2, 3
Adaptation to climate change - where do we go from Bali? 35
be seen how this strategic programme looked like, and the focus of the technology trans-
fer debate was clearly on the mitigation side. However, the developing countries negoti-
ated with a well-tuned strategy and made clear that this is an issue of crucial importance
for their willingness to act constructively in the upcoming negotiations.
Another element decided on was to hold an expert meeting on adaptation technologies
before the next session of the Subsidiary Bodies in June in Bonn, with a view to give
input into the Nairobi Work Programme (see 5.4).
5.3 Continuation of the Least Developed Countries Expert
Group (LEG)
The mandate of the expert group set up to assist the LDCs  in the implementation of the
Convention has been extended in Bali.  Inter alia, this ensures that the LEG can support
the LDCs with the implementation of their National Adaptation Programmes of Action
(NAPAs). By December 2007, 26 LDCs had submitted their NAPAs to the UNFCCC
secretariat. Since the NAPAs are designed to assess the most urgent adaptation needs and
to identify priority projects, immediate implementation of the projects is meaningful to
enhance the adaptive capacity of the countries. However, adequate financing for all NA-
PAs has not been secured so far, with only 163 million USD being pledged to the LDCF.
The costs for African LDCs alone amount to some 350 to 700 million USD.82 The LEG
has also been asked to set up a work programme until June which entails actions needed
with reference to relevant UNFCCC processes, such as the NWP.
5.4 Nairobi Work Programme on Impacts, Vulnerability and
Adaptation (NWP)
The Nairobi Work Programme was adopted during the 2006 COP in Nairobi and built on
previous COP decisions. Its main objectives are to a) improve the Parties’ understanding
and assessment of impacts, vulnerability and adaptation and to b) assist in making in-
formed decisions on practical adaptation actions and measures to respond to climate
change on a sound scientific, technical and socio-economic basis.83  Since then, its adop-
tion workshops on climate-related risks and extreme events and on adaptation planning
and practices have taken place in Cairo and Rome, just to name two activities. A recent
document gives an overview of the objectives and the activities of the NWP.84  In Bali,
the secretariat presented a number of synthesis reports, in addition to the two workshop
reports.
Also, the establishment of an expert group and its potential functions were on the agenda.
Before the COP it became clear that there are different opinions regarding the necessity
of such an expert group. On the one hand different expert groups already exist in the
UNFCCC framework, an overlap of activities should be avoided. On the other hand, the
SIDS have underlined the need for advice to sort out the many information gathered
through the NWP. Finally, there was no decision in Bali. The secretariat was asked to
provide the Parties with a "lessons learned" report on the inclusion of experts in the con-
text of the NWP until the 2008 in Poland. This report should serve as a basis for further
consideration on the establishment of an expert group.85
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6 Conclusions, challenges and the AWG-LCA
agenda
6.1 Conclusions on the Bali negotiations
Adaptation was high on the agenda of the Bali negotiations. It prominently features in the
Bali Action Plan, on the same level as mitigation. The Bali Road Map is still a vague
framework for the negotiations to come in the next months on the way to a post-2012
climate change agreement. It does not contain any figures, e.g. regarding the financial
means available. Therefore, only limited conclusions can be drawn regarding the per-
formance in the six minimum requirements for a fair and appropriate agreement that were
presented in the introduction.
1. Sufficient and solid funding of adaptation measures and the coverage of damages
caused by climate change in the most vulnerable countries, particularly LDCs and small
island states. This can be achieved with the help of new and innovative financial instru-
ments:
The figures available from scientific studies clearly state that present funding is insuffi-
cient, and the Bali Action Plan in numerous ways addresses this, inter alia through the
consideration of providing new and additional resources (1e) i). The particular vulnerable
countries are defined – LDCs, SIDS, and further taking into account the needs of coun-
tries in Africa affected by drought, desertification and floods (1c) i) – and innovative
means of funding to assist the particularly vulnerable are on the agenda (1e) iii).
Investing in adaptation in the North and the South
"Recent investment of hundreds of millions by developed countries in climate adaptation
measures in their own countries and reserving potential billions of dollars to protect
themselves will further widen the gap between North and South. There should be a fair
balance between investments in developed countries to deal with climate change and
contribution to adaptation funding for the most vulnerable people in the South."86
Maldives on behalf of the LDCs
2. Giving priority to the needs of the most vulnerable groups of the population, based on
a human rights based approach87, and to locally developed adaptation approaches
against the negative effects of anthropogenic climate change;
This is probably the weakest part of the Bali Roadmap. Particular vulnerability is only
addressed on the level of Parties, of countries. No mentioning can be found anywhere
regarding the most vulnerable groups of the population. The only sentence in the Bali
Action Plan linked to this question addresses the role of the Convention in "encouraging
multilateral bodies, the public and private sectors and civil society" (para 1c) v).
Designing the funding guidelines for the Adaptation Fund in a way that applying Parties
should pay particular attention to the most vulnerable groups could be an anchor to high-
light their needs, but also their experience and capacities which could be worth consider-
ing for scaling-up adaptation.
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3. Scientific and technological support for the expansion of capacities to design and im-
plement adaptation strategies;
Two decisions taken in Bali outside of the 2009 roadmap are important in this regard. The
continuation of work mandate of the Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LEG, see
5.3) and the new and stronger five-year mandate for the Expert Group on Technology
Transfer (EGTT, 5.2), although the latter one will probably pay more (but not exclusive)
attention to mitigation technologies. The Nairobi Work Programme is another important
element in strategies to increase capacities to design and implement adaptation strategies.
Effectively supporting the work of the Adaptation Fund Board is another key purpose
arising after Bali. The very broad definition of adaptation (1c) i) as well as the language
of the technology building block address the need for scientific and technological support
in the Bali Action Plan.
4. Ensuring that support mechanisms create further incentives (such as insurance based
mechanisms) in order to maximise the effectiveness of adaptation strategies;
The term "incentives" in the context of adaptation explicitly appears in the financing text
part, where positive incentives for developing country Parties for adaptation (and mitiga-
tion) (1e) ii) and "means to incentivize the implementation of adaptation actions on the
basis of sustainable development policies" (1e) iv) are mentioned. The objective of
maximising the effectiveness of adaptation strategies is not mentioned. Further concreti-
sation, which incentive mechanisms could play a role in addition to "simple" flows of
financial resources is necessary, since failure to bring about effective adaptation would
severely complicate decisions to transfer billions of dollars from industrialised countries
to the developing countries, regardless of the justified claims for increased financial trans-
fers.
5. Assessing the political and practical potential of instruments that link mitigation and
adaptation purposes.
The Bali Roadmap lacks any explicit wording linking adaptation and mitigation. How-
ever, practically there is little doubt that linking mechanisms will be discussed in the
search for new and additional resources and the financing instruments needed to deliver
these (see 3.4).
Already today it is obvious that the extent to which Annex I countries financially support
adaptation measures has two major implications. On the one hand it has an effect on the
number of promising strategies that could be developed and implemented and on the
other hand it positively affects chances for the realisation of a progressive post 2012
agreement.
From a strategic point of view, it is important that there is a sound potential for building
new alliances between certain countries. For example, limiting global warming to 2°C
above pre-industrial levels (or even below that threshold) is a vision shared by the EU and
Norway, but also by the LDCs and the SIDS. Having a look at the financing instruments
being discussed, most of them are linked to mitigating emissions in one way or the other.
This indicates that the scale of financing generated will – at least to an important extent –
depend on how deep emission cuts will be in developed countries. But it is also very
likely that the Annex I countries emission reductions offered will be much higher, if
emerging economies engage in serious decarbonisation, which is undoubtedly needed in
order to stay below 2°C. Thus, the LDCs and SIDS, which are negotiating jointly with the
emerging economies in the G77/China block, should also have a clear interest in urging
these emerging economies to intensify their efforts to  combine development policies
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with accelerated decarbonisation. All these aspects will impact on the extent to which a
post-2012 agreement will be able to support developing countries’ adaptation efforts.
This analysis has shown that none of the answers raised have been answered by the Bali
Roadmap. This  is not to be expected, since it is only a framework for further negotia-
tions. But all of the important issues addressed in the questions raised are on the negotia-
tion table for a post-2012 agreement. The least attention has been paid to the role of par-
ticularly vulnerable groups of the population.
6.2 Implications for the AWG-LCA work programme
The analysis of the Bali Action Plan made clear that a lot of work lies before the nego-
tiators on the issue of adaptation, not mentioning other relevant issues such as mitigation.
Or how India´s closing statement in Bali put it:
"The road to Bali was in principle strong, the road from Bali must be much stronger. We
need to move forward to Poland to Denmark, and beyond, for what is at stake is saving
our future generations. And therefore it is not a question of what you will commit or what
I will commit. It is a question of what we will commit together to meet that challenge!"88
In early April 2008, the first post-Bali negotiation sessions will take place in Bangkok
(Thailand). Setting up the work programme and the respective schedule until the COP
2009 in Copenhagen will be the key objective of the Bangkok Climate Change Talks. In
the submissions on this work programme, the EU made the most detailed suggestion for a
work plan. For the purpose of this paper, we condensed the EU proposal to those aspects
directly relevant for the building blocks adaptation and financing, up to the 2008 COP in
Poznan. But it is worth recognising the whole work programme proposal, since the four
building blocks are inextricably linked to each other.
Table 6: Adaptation related work programme for the AWG-LCA, EU proposal
Date/session Activity
(references below are  to relevant paragraphs in Decision
1/CP.13)
Other work under Conven-
tion or KP relevant to Bali
Action Plan ( w.r.t. para-
graph 11 of 1/CP.13)
AWGLCA 1
31 March - 4
April
2008
Agreement on work programme
Start consideration/discussion of main concepts for all
building blocks.
In-session workshop on shared vision, 1 (a): perspectives on
low-carbon and climate-safe development pathways to avoid
dangerous climate change
10-11 March EGTT meeting
to
agree work programme
25 April 2008 Further Submissions on issues pertaining to the work pro-gramme for next session, including submission on a shared
vision.
16 May 2008 In preparation of AGLCA 2: Secretariat synthesis on the
submissions
AGLCA 2 2-
13 June 2008
Shared vision: 1(a) Round table
Adaptation
1(c) (i) in particular:
- vulnerability assessments and prioritisation of action
- capacity building and response strategies
- integration of adaptation actions into sectoral and national
planning
Adaptation:
relevant work under SBI and
SBSTA, in particular the
informal pre-sessional meet-
ing to consider
further actions, based on the
information contained in
paragraph 1 (a) on the ad-
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- needs of developing countries that are particularly vulner-
able to the adverse effects of climate change
In session workshop to enhance action on adaptation, fo-
cusing on the actions undertaken and experience of parties in
integrating adaptation actions into sectoral and national
planning.
In addition, input from SBI and SBSTA. Secretariat to make
presentations on activities and respective conclusions un-
dertaken under decisions 1/CP.10, the NWP and the NAPAs.
Finance and Investment
In-session workshop on enhancing finance and investment
in support of mitigation and adaptation, with particular
attention to the role of the private sector and innovative
mechanisms
verse effects of climate
change, of the SBI 27 con-
clusions on Decision
1/CP10, as well as the infor-
mal pre-sessional meeting to
be held before SBSTA 28 to
consider the outcomes of the
activities held up to that
session.
18 July 2008 Further Submissions on issues pertaining to the work pro-gramme for the next session.
Financial Flows Paper update from the Secretariat, including
detailed analysis of the potential of new mechanisms in
relation to the finance and investment needs for adaptation
and mitigation and making use of the in-session workshop
outcomes.
AWGLCA 3
August
/September
2008
Shared vision: continuation
Adaptation
1(c) (ii) – (iv)
Continuation of previous session, 1(c)(i), in particular:
- financial needs assessments
- specific projects and programmes
- other ways to enable climate resilient development
- means to incentivise the implementation of adaptation
actions
Mitigation and Adaptation
In addition: consider 1(b)(vii) and 1(c)(v) – strengthening
catalytic role of Convention
Finance and investment
In relation to mitigation and adaptation Analysis of the
updated technical paper by the Secretariat
Adaptation
Take into consideration the
outcomes of the discussion
on Decision 1/CP.10 and on
the activities for the second
phase of the NWP.
17 October
2008
Further Submissions on issues on work programme for next
session, in particular on the review and stock take exercise
AWGLCA 4
1-12 Decem-
ber
2008 (COP14)
Shared vision
High level Ministerial debate on the shared vision, including
a long term goal for emission reductions.
Adaptation
Continuation of 1(c) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv)
Finance
In-session workshop on finance, with a view to integrating
finance in relation with mitigation, adaptation and technol-
ogy
Input from other processes conform paragraph 11 of Deci-
sion 1.CP/13
Report to COP, stock taking exercise and determination of
further work – conform paragraphs 9 and 10 of Decision
1.CP/13, and definition of further work in line with issues
identified under paragraph 1 of 1.CP/13
Conclusions, including a focused list of options under each
building block to be taken forward for work in 2009
Review of the LDCF
Source: own compilation based on UNFCCC 2008a
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The EU suggest to start with negotiations on all building blocks in parallel. A reason for
that are for example that financing mechanisms for adaptation and mitigation will proba-
bly be linked to the level of emission cuts. However, this parallel approach is not shared
by all of the stakeholders. For example, Michael Zammit Cutajar, one of the chairs of the
AWG-LCA, suggests to start off with negotiations on the adaptation building block:
"It is better to put adaptation first. All countries have to adapt; this is the message unify-
ing us against our common threat. We cannot save the biosphere in its present form, too
much change is already built into the system – an estimated +0.7C over pre-industrial
levels so far, and as much another +1C to come. (The EU has supported a +2C maximum
target since 1996). Having absorbed that message, we can then understand mitigation as
what needs to be done to keep the adaptation challenge manageable."89
Ivo de Boer, Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC, in a recent speech argued that "as part
of the initial phase of international climate change negotiations in 2008, there needs to
be a focus on designing the mechanisms to support and enable action by developing
countries […]."90 This can be interpreted in a way that the negotiations should start with
the building blocks technology and financing.
Due to the extensive discussions needed in all of the building blocks and their interlink-
ages, there is good reason to start with parallel negotiations on all four. But it will be in-
teresting how the discussions evolve in Bangkok.
Planning the work91
"It will be important to remain focused and results-oriented at this session. The Chair will
make efforts to facilitate discussion on:
• "How" and "when" issues will be addressed;
• What arrangements will be needed to facilitate the work.
The Chair will seek inputs, in particular on the following:
(a) How to ensure that issues that are closely interrelated are addressed in a coherent
manner?
(b) What issues need to be clarified and what information is required, including submis-
sions from Parties and preparatory work by the secretariat?
(c) What in-session and intersessional activities will be needed and what should they fo-
cus on?
(d) What inputs from other ongoing UNFCCC processes will be useful for the work?"
In addition to the question of timing, there are more suggestions worth taking into ac-
count.
On a principal level it is important for the process what the EU proposes: "[…] it is of the
utmost importance to effectively engage practitioners and stakeholders in the discussions
on the elements of an agreement in Copenhagen." As a logical consequence, representa-
tives from governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations (in-
cluding the private sector) should participate in the in-session workshops "in order to
promote an open and constructive exchange of experiences, thus contributing to a more
thorough and shared understanding."92
                                                     
89 Interview with the Malta Independent, 8 March.
90 UNFCCC 2008c
91 UNFCCC 2008d
92 UNFCCC 2008a: 69
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Pakistan urges that "all Parties and stakeholders are required to pool up intellectual,
technical, financial and administrative resources and to join forces including Govern-
ments, IGOs, NGOs, Private sectors, civil society and individual around the world to
combat adverse impacts of climate change."93
On a practical level, suggestions for other submissions and in-session workshops exist,
inter alia those made by the Climate Action Network International (CAN):94
- Submission on vulnerability assessments, prioritisation of actions, financial
needs assessments, capacity-building and response strategies, integration of
adaptation actions into sectoral and national planning, specific projects and
programs, means to incentivize the implementation of adaptation actions,
and other ways to enable climate-resilient development and reduce vulner-
ability of all Parties, followed by an in-session workshop to share good practice
examples of effective adaptation of different levels.
- Submission on Parties´ views of how adaptation of the most vulnerable groups
of the population in particular can be most effectively supported.
- Submission on potential pilot projects of risk sharing and risk transfer
mechanisms (including insurance) for adaptation, followed by an in-session
workshop to explore opportunities for rapid implementation.
- Submission on innovative financing instruments that could deliver the magni-
tude of finance required, including for the provision of new and additional re-
sources and funding for adaptation in the particularly vulnerable parties, followed
by an in-session workshop.
In addition to the continueing and intensifying discussion within the UNFCCC, it has
been addressed before that there are other discussion processes ongoing in international
politics that are relevant for the issues analysed here, such as the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals (MDGs) process or the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR).
Also, the G8 have climate change high on the agenda (in particular regarding a long-term
mitigation goal relevant for the shared-vision and the Climate Investment Funds of the
World Bank). With the agreement of the COP, appropriate inputs from these processes
could be brought into the discussions under the UNFCCC for debate by all Parties. Al-
though overloading of the agenda must be avoided, addressing climate change effectively
and adequately is a challenge for mankind of an unprecedented scale, and thusall proc-
esses, information and stakeholders that could contribute to living up to this challenge
should be included in a workable manner.
... did you find this publication interesting and helpful?
You can support the work of Germanwatch with a donation to:
Bank fuer Sozialwirtschaft AG
BIC/Swift: BFSWDE31BER
IBAN: DE33 1002 0500 0003 212300
Thank you for your support!
                                                     
93 UNFCCC 2008a: 59
94 CAN 2008
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